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1996), the creation and maintenance of "social worlds" and "doable" problems (Clark and Fujimura 1992; Fujimura 1987; Star 1995) , and technical work practices (Barley and Bechky 1994; Barley and Off 1997; Orr 1996) Constructivist approaches to science focus on the technical details of scientific work to demonstrate the local, contingent, and constructed nature of scientific knowledge claims (Clarke and Fujimura 1992; KnorrCetina 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Lynch 1984) . Recently, work in Science Studies has turned to the organizational embeddedness of scientific practices (Galison 1997; Knorr-Cetina 1999; Sims 1999 ; Thorpe and Shapin 2000; Vaughan 1999b ). I extend that focus, paying specific attention to microlevel questions of monitoring, control, resistance, and evaluation consonant with industrial ethnographies (Burawoy 1982; Dalton 1959; Gouldner 1954; Stark 1990 ) and examinations of high-tech work (Barley and Zabusky 1997; Kunda 1992; Vaughan 1996) . I examine the local status orders and social control apparatuses constructed and maintained in focused gatherings such as laboratory meetings (Goffman 1961 ).
Four disparate literatures frame this ethnography. Sociology of science's traditional focus on reward and outcome stratification (Cole and Cole 1973; Merton 1968; Zuckerman 1977; Zuckerman and Cole 1975) One key finding from the Science Studies literature is that there is an "art" to doing science (Fujimura 1996; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Lynch 1984; Traweek 1988) . Tacit knowledge can mean the difference between experimental success and failure. Such know-how makes replication problematic (Collins 1974 (Collins , 1975 ) and makes monitoring difficult in organizations like the H-lab.3
Following March and Simon (1958; Simon 1959) , I treat the H-lab as a structure of attention that directs the information search and use efforts of its members. Under this conception, information flows rather than hierarchy, and unobtrusive control rather than bureaucratic governance, characterize the structure of authority. Finally, two social psychological approaches to group processes, expectation states theory (Meeker 1981; Ridgeway and Walker 1995) and legitimation theory (Berger et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988; ) 6 For ease of reference I use the terms "muffin meeting" and "lab meeting" interchangeably.
Though the term Manduca defines a genus, I
use it to refer to the H-lab's model species.
Manduca's common name comes from its propensity to eat tobacco and the presence of a small brown "horn" that grows on the head of larvae.
of the antenna lobe of the brain. Despite a shared object of inquiry, their efforts are differentiated both by subjects of study and levels of analysis. One set of researchers seeks to understand how male Manduca apprehend and respond to female sex pheromones. Male moths reliably distinguish females of their own species from those of closely related species by discriminating among chemically similar pheromone scents. The ability to respond to the "correct" olfactory stimulus enables male moths to locate viable mates.
Another group of scientists attempts to determine how gravid female moths locate appropriate "host plants." After mating, female On any given workday, three major laboratory groups work in cramped office and lab spaces spread across three floors of two different campus buildings. Scientists at work "in" the H-lab often do not communicate outside their projects although they share a common topic and belong to the same organization. Practically, then, the lab's major endeavors are only tenuously linked.
Although Jim, the lab's director, strives to integrate these tasks, such synthesis cannot be accomplished during routine daily work because of the group's intellectual and physical dispersion. Weekly meetings provide a venue for presentation and discussion of ongoing research and enable the group to weave coherent knowledge about Manduca from diverse project threads. Like gatherings observed in engineering firms (Kunda 1992) and academic research groups (Galison 1997; Knorr-Cetina 1999; Traweek 1988 Scientific research is characterized by worker autonomy, reliance on tacit knowledge, dependence upon trust, and, rarely, direct replication (Barley and Bechky 1994; Chubin and Hackett 1990; Collins 1974 Collins , 1985 Dasgupta and David 1994; Kunda 1992 ). These factors contribute to a collegial control system that bases quality evaluations on reputation and the ability to defend novel claims. Oversight follows a craft-based model (Stinchcombe 1959) , further lessening the effectiveness of Jim's bureaucratic authority.
Jim needs to exert control over his workers to ensure their findings' quality. As lab director, Jim's name goes on every publication arising from H-lab research. Adding his name to manuscripts represents an "investment of credibility" (Latour and Woolgar 1979) . By "signing-off' on a paper, Jim throws his scientific reputation behind its claims, furthering its chances in the life sciences' single blind review process (Chubin and Hackett 1990; Merton 1968 Control problems common to all workplaces are magnified by the diversity, uncertainty, and technical difficulty of H-lab endeavors. In addition to these "passive" control problems, H-lab researchers actively resist attempts to manage their days. Like other highly trained workers, these scientists value their autonomy, resent direct management, and enjoy the flexibility characteristic of professional (Dalton 1959; Morrill 1994; Powell 1985) and technical careers (Barley and Orr 1996; Orr 1996; Vaughan 1996 Barley (1996) and Orr (1996) demonstrate the extent to which tacit knowledge is essential to technical workers, emphasizing the strategies used to pass such know-how on to newcomers. Kusterer (1978) shows that "un- (Simon 1959 ). Simon's (1959) key insight is that individuals make decisions based on imperfect information. Rather than engaging in irrationally difficult and time consuming information searches to enable interest maximization, humans "satisfice." Satisficing is accomplished by using rules of thumb, heuristics, habits, and schemas to make decisions (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982) . In organizations, satisficing is often accomplished through rules, routines, and standard operating procedures that grow in the direction of key uncertainties (Nelson and Winter 1983) and instantiate the "logics of appropriateness" that bound and make sense of information flows for decision-makers (March and Olsen 1976; Weick 1976 Weick , 1995 . Inside and outside of organizations, sastisficing is based on premises that direct the search for and use of information.
Under uncertain conditions, satisficing can streamline and standardize decision-making (Powell 1985) , but it also has a "dark side" (Vaughan 1999a ). Vaughan (1996 Vaughan ( , 1999a demonstrates that the routines, standard procedures, and decision heuristics characteristic of uncertain technical workplaces can lead to mistakes and even disaster through "routine nonconformity." Bounded rationality and premise-driven satisficing also enable unobtrusive control in organizations (Braverman 1974; Perrow 1986) . Premise-based decision-making, then, is a decidedly doubleedged sword.
Premises are taken-for-granted assumptions that direct individual attention to particular stimuli and evoke specific sets of responses to those stimuli. Authority is unobtrusive to the extent that it governs work and workers by controlling the premises that structure attention rather than by directly managing choices. As long as a superior controls the premises, the choices can be left free because all possible outcomes are already constrained by the chooser's structured attention (Powell 1985:147) . In the extreme case, alternatives counter to organizational premises will not even occur to employees as possibilities. 12 Differences here might also be colored by Caitlin's gender. I will return to the question of whether gender operates as an organizing principle for H-lab skepticism. For now, note that these interactions are very different in character despite the fact that in both cases the backfilling was done by women. Though often attacked, Merton's (1976) norms of open science provide a starting point for thinking about skepticism and social differentiation. Merton (1976:6) argued that four normative imperatives-(1) universalism, (2) communalism, (3) disinterestedness, and (4) organized skepticism-make up the "ethos" of modem science. The validity and relevance of these norms have been hotly contested in works stressing the importance of corporate or state interests to science (Aronowitz 1988; Mukerji 1989; Noble 1977) ; the impact of scientists' personal beliefs, biases, and agendas (Epstein 1996; Harding 1991; Martin 1991) ; global and scientific structures of inequality (Haraway 1996; Stephan and Levin 1992; Zuckerman, Cole, and Bruer 1991) ; and the contextual and historical nature of scientific skepticism (Kuhn 1962; Shapin 1994) . Nevertheless, considering socially organized skepticism as a local mechanism for organizing and evaluating work rather than a global scientific norm has potential explanatory payoffs at the level of laboratory work.
Unlike Merton (1976) (Meeker 1981; Ridgeway and Walker 1995) and legitimation theory (Berger et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988) (Foschi 1989 (Foschi , 1991 . This is exactly the prediction at the heart of the Matthew effect (Merton 1968) and it is born out in examinations of simultaneous discoveries, "multiples," that link social control to the ascription of prestige (Cozzens 1989) . The second dimension introduces some organizational bases of evaluation to the more informal sources of expectations highlighted by social psychological theory. Here I draw on differences among formal organizational positions in the lab, regardless of the positions' occupants. In essence, this dimension depicts characteristics of the formal "offices" that are occupied by individual Hlab researchers. These scientists firmly be-13 Indeed, some social psychologists (Ridgeway and Walker 1995:294) have drawn on classical ethnographic vignettes, notably Whyte's (1943) description of a bowling competition among members of the Norton Street Gang, to suggest that expectations shape the quality of individual performances regardless of actual skill levels, as group members tailor their levels of success to match the expectations others hold for them. Experimental attempts to untangle the relationship between stereotypes and performance levels (Steele 1997; Steele and Aronson 1995) have uncovered similar patterns, finding that the risk of confirming a negative stereotype of one's group negatively affects individual performance on standardized tests.
14 While levels of experience often accompany higher prestige formal positions, this is not always the case. One of the most closely monitored experimental procedures I observed was conducted by a visiting scientist who is a full professor at another university. Brent spent a sabbatical in the H-lab in hopes of mastering a new experimental technique. His first experiments using the method were closely observed by Nathan, the H-lab scientist most familiar with the procedure. Beth: "You might also want to ask her about her method. Before she came here she worked on really small beetles. That is a really difficult animal. She is an expert with these methods and she has techniques that we do not. Also, she is really good with chemistry. She has a really strong background, stronger than anyone here. So the answer to your implication that she hasn't thought through her controls is that she probably has!"
Jim: "There is no question about the chemistry.
But she is working in Bill's lab and we know that (Collins 1974 (Collins , 1985 , scientific credibility (Latour and Woolgar 1986) , the details of shop talk (Lynch 1984) , experimental procedures (Galison 1997) , and even the flow of time (Traweek 1988) in constructing the outcomes of scientific research.
In recent years, Science Studies research has shifted toward a consideration of scientific practices embedded in organizations (Vaughan 1999b) . This article extends the organizational turn in Science Studies (Hessenbruch 2000; Sims 1999; Thorpe and Shapin 2000) by addressing microlevel issues of control, coordination, and resistance in multidisciplinary workplaces. These concerns have more commonly been addressed in classical industrial ethnographies (Burawoy 1982; Dalton 1959; Gouldner 1954; Roy 1954) and contemporary examinations of organizational decision-making (Vaughan 1996 (Vaughan , 1999a , technical (Kunda 1992; Orr 1996) Considering science as work also offers a corrective to Mertonian Sociology of Science, which focuses more on institutional reward structures, norms of behavior (Merton 1968 (Merton , 1976 , and outcome stratification (Cole and Cole 1973; Cozzens 1989; Zuckerman 1977 ) than on the details of daily practice. Focusing on structured interactions within laboratory groups can link these disparate approaches by suggesting that the processes that constitute and maintain behavioral inequities in laboratory groups provide insights into both workplace control and knowledge construction.
In this conception, control and evaluation are flip sides of the same coin. Skepticism is a mechanism for collectively establishing the veracity of novel findings, but its evaluative function is inextricably linked to unobtrusive control. Such control is based on bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958; Simon 1959) and implies that an organization's primary purpose is to structure the attention and direct the efforts of its members. As it is deployed in H-lab meetings, organized skepticism sets the premises that guide choice of scientific problem and evaluation. By setting boundaries on behavior and decision-making, organized skepticism limits the range of problems H-lab researchers examine and the methods they use while subtly shaping the character of findings that eventually "make it out" of the laboratory.
But scientific judgments are not pure and workplace control is less than total. Cognitive processes illuminated by social psychological research (Berger et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Berger 1986 ;) link assessments to expectations which in turn stem from interaction in emergent and existing status orders. Paradoxically, however, separating evaluations from claims also opens avenues for junior scientists to resist their senior's evaluation and control attempts. Socially organized skepticism offers varied benefits to differently positioned scientists, but it also leaves room to maneuver. Indi- (Murnighan and Conlon 1991) . While the H-lab is not representative of these diverse organizational settings, unobtrusive control, status-based evaluation, and skeptical verification of work quality may well be. Indeed, linking workplace control and evaluation to the more general dynamics of task groups through social psychological theory suggests this framework's applicability across a wide range of contexts. I expect control and evaluation mechanisms similar to scientific skepticism to be most apparent in organizations and occupations in which 
